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The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) criminalizes a broad range of
conduct related to the compromise of computer systems. Specifically, the CFAA prohibits unauthorized access to computer systems, defining such access as that which
occurs “without authorization” or in a manner that “exceeds authorized access.”
Courts interpreting the meaning of unauthorized access under the CFAA have diverged into two camps. On one side, proponents of the broad approach argue that
the CFAA unauthorized access inquiry should focus on access purpose, assessing
whether a given access was conducted for a purpose authorized by the computer
owner. On the other side, proponents of the narrow approach argue that the relevant
inquiry should instead be permission focused, looking only at whether the computer
owner had granted the accesser permission to access the computer (without regard
for why the computer was accessed).
This Comment proposes a three-step framework for assessing CFAA unauthorized access that will resolve the present circuit split. Leveraging concepts from CFAA
case law and offering applicability across a wide range of factual and technological
contexts, this Comment’s Available-Granted-Revoked (AGR) Framework sequentially evaluates (1) whether the computer in question is publicly available or private;
(2) whether the computer’s owner had, at any point, granted the accesser permission
to access the computer; and (3) whether the computer owner had affirmatively revoked the accesser’s permission, if any, prior to the purportedly unauthorized access.
By adopting the Available-Granted-Revoked Framework, courts will be able to effectively advance the interests underlying both sides of the current circuit split and
bring clarity to a persistent legal ambiguity.
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INTRODUCTION
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act1 (CFAA) is the federal
government’s leading computer crime statute, criminalizing a
broad range of conduct related to the compromise of computer systems.2 Specifically, the CFAA prohibits unauthorized access to
computer systems, defining such access as that which occurs
“without authorization” or in a manner that “exceeds authorized
access.”3 Simple, right? Not quite. Let’s consider a few examples.
Jim is a computer hacker who hacks into the Alpha Company’s database and steals valuable company information. Under
the CFAA, this case would be straightforward: Jim’s actions
would almost certainly constitute access of a computer “without
authorization” or in a manner that “exceeds authorized access.”
Easy.
But let’s alter the facts. Suppose Jim is not a hacker, but an
Alpha employee. Let’s further suppose that Alpha has given Jim
access to the database as part of his work duties. Jim decides to
quit his job at Alpha, but not before downloading a folder of sensitive company information and forwarding it to the Beta Company, Alpha’s chief competitor. Has Jim violated the CFAA? He
certainly had access to the database, but did he have authorization when he accessed it for the purpose of sending Alpha’s sensitive information to Beta? What if he quit his job, but then accessed the database six months later, using his old login
credentials? Different result?
Let’s complicate things further by taking our hypothetical out
of the employment context. Suppose Alpha has made its database
publicly available, accessible to anyone with an Internet connection. Jim is a Beta employee and uses a software tool to scrape
data from the public database for Beta’s business uses. Did Jim
engage in CFAA unauthorized access? The database was publicly
available, but does it “exceed authorized access” to run an automated scraper against that information?
As the above examples illustrate, the issue of CFAA unauthorized access is surprisingly complicated, and it is one that
courts have struggled to resolve in the decades since the statute’s
enactment. Generally speaking, courts have divided into a twosided circuit split. Proponents of the “broad approach”—looking

1
2
3

Pub L No 99-474, 100 Stat 1213 (1986), codified as amended at 18 USC § 1030.
See 18 USC § 1030.
See 18 USC § 1030(a), (e)(6) (defining “exceeds authorized access”).
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to enhance the ability of computer owners to protect their systems—posit that the CFAA unauthorized access inquiry should
focus on access purpose, determining whether a given access was
conducted for a purpose authorized by the computer owner.4
Meanwhile, proponents of the “narrow approach”—concerned
about the CFAA becoming an overbroad vehicle for criminal liability—have argued that the relevant inquiry should instead be
permission focused, looking only at whether the owner had
granted the accesser permission to access the computer (without
regard for why that computer was accessed).5
Underlying much of the confusion surrounding the CFAA’s
unauthorized access provisions is the assumption that this circuit
split is fundamentally irreconcilable. In other words, courts must
choose to advance the interests of either the broad approach’s
purpose-focused inquiry or the narrow approach’s permission-focused inquiry.
This Comment rejects that assumption. Instead, it articulates a novel framework that will allow courts to assess CFAA
unauthorized access in a manner that protects the interests prioritized by both the broad and narrow approaches. Leveraging
concepts from CFAA case law and offering applicability across a
wide range of factual and technological contexts, this Comment’s
Available-Granted-Revoked (AGR) Framework sequentially evaluates (1) whether the computer in question is publicly available
or private; (2) whether the computer’s owner had, at any point,
granted the accesser permission to access the computer; and
(3) whether the computer owner had affirmatively revoked the accesser’s permission, if any, prior to the purportedly unauthorized
access.
This approach serves the interests underlying both the broad
and narrow approaches. By limiting the scope of the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions to private computers (via Step 1)
and adopting a permission-focused inquiry in Steps 2 and 3, the
Framework will help to restrain the scope of CFAA liability—a
key aim of narrow-approach advocates. At the same time, by allowing computer owners to terminate access authorization by affirmatively revoking permission (via Step 3), the Framework will
advance the broad-approach goal of allowing computer owners to
protect their systems.

4
5

See Part II.B for additional discussion of the broad approach.
See Part II.C for additional discussion of the narrow approach.
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This Comment proceeds in three parts: Part I provides an
overview of the CFAA, focusing in particular on the statute’s unauthorized access provisions. Part II summarizes the current circuit split regarding how broadly or narrowly the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions should be defined. Finally, Part III
describes the AGR Framework, applies it to several example
cases, and evaluates its benefits and drawbacks.
I. OVERVIEW: THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT (CFAA)
Contemporary discussions surrounding the scope of the
CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions are primarily rooted in
debates about what problem(s) Congress intended the CFAA to
address and what the statute’s text means. Accordingly, Part I.A
describes the historical backdrop against which Congress enacted
the CFAA, and Part I.B offers a high-level summary of the
CFAA’s key provisions.
A. Historical Background and Enactment
The late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed growing public concern about the criminal justice system’s ability to address computer crime. Prior to this period, computer-related crimes were
typically prosecuted under traditional property-crime frameworks.6 However, commentators criticized this approach, with
many observers highlighting the difficulties of applying traditional theft, burglary, and trespass concepts in the digital context.7 Moreover, the 1970s saw rising levels of public and private
computer usage, as well as the entry of computer hackers into the
cultural mainstream, further highlighting the property-crime approach’s shortcomings.8
Acting against this backdrop, Congress enacted the CFAA in
1984,9 framing it as a response to the inability of existing legal
6
See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in
Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 NYU L Rev 1596, 1605–13 (2003).
7
See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, HR Rep No 99-612, 99th Cong, 2d
Sess 5 (1986) (noting that computer data “does not fit well into traditional categories of
property”); Kerr, 78 NYU L Rev at 1613–15 (cited in note 6) (summarizing criticisms of
the property-crime approach to addressing computer crime).
8
See HR Rep No 99-612 at 4–6 (cited in note 7). Several commentators have also
highlighted the role that the 1983 Matthew Broderick film WarGames played in raising
public awareness of computer hacking. See Jonathan Mayer, Cybercrime Litigation, 164
U Pa L Rev 1453, 1458 n 14 (2016) (collecting sources).
9
See United States v Valle, 807 F3d 508, 525 (2d Cir 2015). The Act was initially
passed as the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, then
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frameworks to adequately address the growing computer-crime
problem.10 While it is unclear precisely what the bill’s drafters
viewed as the parameters of computer crime, the congressional
reports accompanying the 1984 Act and its 1986 amendments
specifically focused on the threat computer hackers posed.11 For
instance, these reports described the Act as prohibiting the computer equivalent of “breaking and entering,”12 and illustrated the
severity of the computer-crime problem by describing incidents
involving hackers breaking into computer systems containing financial information and hospital records.13 These reports thus
make clear that, at minimum, Congress intended the CFAA to
address the threat of computer hackers.
B. Statutory Overview
The CFAA criminalizes a range of conduct generally related
to the compromise of computer systems and offers a civil remedy
for entities impacted by such conduct.14 Most notably, the Act prohibits certain unauthorized access of computers, a concept that
encompasses both access “without authorization” and access in a
manner that “exceeds authorized access.”15
The CFAA defines “computer” broadly, encompassing any
“electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high
amended by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986. See Kerr, 78 NYU L Rev at 1598
n 11 (cited in note 6). Several states passed similar laws during this time period as well.
See id at 1615–16.
10 See Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, HR Rep
No 98-894, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 8–10 (1984).
11 See, for example, id at 10–12; HR Rep No 99-612 at 5–7 (cited in note 7).
12 HR Rep No 98-894 at 20 (cited in note 10).
13 See HR Rep No 99-612 at 6 (cited in note 7) (financial records); Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act of 1986, S Rep No 99-432, 99th Cong, 2d Sess 2–3 (1986) (hospital records).
14 See generally 18 USC § 1030.
15 See, for example, 18 USC § 1030(a)(1)–(2), (4) (prohibiting access both “without
authorization” and in a manner that “exceeds authorized access” in a range of contexts).
Though unauthorized access can be fairly characterized as the CFAA’s primary focus, it is
not the only activity the statute prohibits. See, for example, 18 USC § 1030(a)(5)(A) (prohibiting one from “knowingly caus[ing] the transmission of a program, information, code,
or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally caus[ing] damage . . . to a protected computer”); 18 USC § 1030(a)(6) (prohibiting the trafficking of stolen passwords);
18 USC § 1030(a)(7) (prohibiting extortion schemes involving threats to damage or illicitly
obtain information from a protected computer). In addition, it is important to note that
“without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access” are not always used in tandem
within the statute. Specifically, some CFAA provisions only prohibit access “without authorization.” For example, 18 USC § 1030(a)(3) criminalizes the actions of an individual
who “intentionally, without authorization to access any nonpublic computer of a department or agency of the United States, accesses such a computer.”

2020]

Available, Granted, Revoked

1443

speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or
storage functions,” as well as “any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction
with such device.”16 Though several CFAA provisions are applicable only to “protected computers,”17 that term extends to any computer “used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication.”18 Courts and commentators view this definition as
encompassing “all computers with Internet access.”19
As a result of Congress’s broad conceptualization of “computer,” the applicability of the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions is not limited to traditional desktop or laptop computers.
For example, courts have applied these provisions in cases involving purportedly unauthorized accesses to websites, on the theory
that the servers hosting such websites constitute computers under the CFAA.20 Thus, the scope of computers subject to the
CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions is quite expansive.
In sharp contrast to the generally well-understood meaning
of computers, courts have split on the meanings of the CFAA’s
unauthorized access terms—“without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access.” With respect to “without authorization,”
this is unsurprising—the statute simply does not define that
term. However, courts have also struggled to apply “exceeds authorized access,” which the statute does define, albeit somewhat
ambiguously, as “to access a computer with authorization and to
use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer
that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”21 This confusion about the meaning of “without authorization” and “exceeds

16

18 USC § 1030(e)(1).
See, for example, 18 USC § 1030(a)(2)(C), (4)–(5), (7).
18 18 USC § 1030(e)(2)(B).
19 United States v Nosal, 676 F3d 854, 859 (9th Cir 2012) (en banc) (Nosal I). See also
Samantha Jensen, Comment, Abusing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Why Broad
Interpretations of the CFAA Fail, 36 Hamline L Rev 81, 92–93 (2013); Garrett D. Urban,
Note, Causing Damage Without Authorization: The Limitations of Current Judicial Interpretations of Employee Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 52 Wm
& Mary L Rev 1369, 1384 & n 88 (2011); Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 Minn L Rev 1561, 1568 (2010). In addition, some commentators have argued that even an Internet connection might not be necessary to render a
computer “protected.” See, for example, Kerr, 94 Minn L Rev at 1571 (arguing that
“protected computer” covers any machine that has “a microchip or that permits digital
storage”).
20 See hiQ Labs, Inc v LinkedIn Corp, 938 F3d 985, 999 (9th Cir 2019) (characterizing
servers as “protected computer[s]” under the CFAA), petition for cert filed (Mar 9, 2020).
21 18 USC § 1030(e)(6).
17
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authorized access” is at the core of the CFAA unauthorized access
circuit split, examined in the next Part.
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT: WHAT IS UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS?
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the statute’s lack of definitional clarity, the federal courts of appeals are split regarding the
meaning of the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions—namely,
the proper interpretation of “without authorization” and “exceeds
authorized access.”22 This split features two competing approaches: the broad approach (articulating a more expansive view
of the conduct prohibited by these terms) and the narrow approach (asserting a more limited view of the proscribed conduct).
At a high level, this split is driven by opposing views regarding
whether the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions should account for the purpose of a given access. In other words, courts disagree about whether an access of a computer is unauthorized under the CFAA if the accesser has permission to access the
computer but does so for a purpose of which the computer owner
does not approve.
This Part examines the contours of the CFAA unauthorized
access circuit split in greater depth. Part II.A begins with a brief
review of the CFAA’s legislative history, focusing specifically on
how that source offers little help in elucidating the meaning of the
unauthorized access provisions. Part II.B then discusses the
purpose-focused inquiry of the broad approach, while Part II.C
examines the permission-focused narrow approach. Part II.D concludes by analyzing two additional concepts—permission revocation and the public/private computer distinction—that have
emerged in more recent CFAA unauthorized access cases.
A. (A Largely Unhelpful) Legislative History
The CFAA’s legislative history offers little interpretive help
in resolving the unauthorized access circuit split. The statute’s
drafters appear not to have realized that the terms “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access” would be perceived
22 As of May 3, 2020, the Supreme Court has granted one certiorari petition relevant
to the CFAA unauthorized access circuit split, and another is currently pending before the
Court. See generally United States v Van Buren, 940 F3d 1192 (11th Cir 2019), cert
granted, 2020 WL 1906566; hiQ Labs, Inc v LinkedIn Corp, 938 F3d 985 (9th Cir 2019),
petition for cert filed (Mar 9, 2020). In 2017, the Court denied certiorari petitions pertaining to two relevant Ninth Circuit cases concerning the split. See generally Nosal v United
States, 138 S Ct 314 (2017); Power Ventures, Inc v Facebook, Inc, 138 S Ct 313 (2017).
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as ambiguous, resulting in a “sparse legislative record.”23 Moreover, the content that the record does include sheds little light on
what Congress intended to accomplish with the unauthorized access provisions. Courts and commentators generally agree that in
passing the original 1984 version of the statute, Congress was primarily concerned about the threat of computer hacking, which it
understood as “trespassing into computer systems or data.”24 The
original statute, like the present version, prohibited access “without authorization.”25 However, in place of “exceeds authorized access,” the statute penalized one who, “having accessed a computer
with authorization, uses the opportunity such access provides for
purposes to which such authorization does not extend.”26 In the
1986 amendments to the CFAA, Congress replaced that language
with “exceeds authorized access.”27 This modification is the source
of much of the present confusion surrounding the scope of the unauthorized access provisions—a confusion that the AGR Framework, introduced in Part III.B, is intended to remedy.
There is some dispute about whether the 1984 language actually supports the broad approach’s purpose-based view of the
CFAA.28 However, even assuming that it does, analysts disagree
about Congress’s intent behind the 1986 amendments. Proponents of the broad approach posit that “exceeds authorized access” is merely a rephrasing of the purpose-based inquiry of the
1984 language, while narrow-approach advocates counter that
“exceeds authorized access” is an express rejection of that
purpose-based view.29 Unhelpfully, both sides can summon congressional commentary supporting their respective approaches.30
23 David J. Rosen, Note, Limiting Employee Liability Under the CFAA: A Code-Based
Approach to “Exceeds Authorized Access”, 27 Berkeley Tech L J 737, 744 (2012) (noting,
for example, that the 1986 Senate Report described the meaning of “exceeds authorized
access” as “self-explanatory”).
24 United States v Valle, 807 F3d 508, 525 (2d Cir 2015).
25 Id.
26 HR Rep No 98-894 at 2 (emphasis added) (cited in note 10). See also Laura
Bernescu, Comment, When Is a Hack Not a Hack: Addressing the CFAA’s Applicability to
the Internet Service Context, 2013 U Chi Legal F 633, 638.
27 Valle, 807 F3d at 525.
28 See, for example, id at 526 (noting that “even when Congress referenced the user’s
‘purposes,’ it spoke in terms of the particular computer files or data to which the user’s
access rights extended”).
29 Id at 525–26.
30 For examples summarizing both sides of this debate about the 1986 amendments,
see id; Rosen, Note, 27 Berkeley Tech L J at 745 (cited in note 23). A review of primary
sources supports commentators’ confusion. Compare S Rep No 99-432 at 9 (cited in
note 13) (stating that Congress merely intended for “exceeds authorized access” to
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Thus, courts have “generally steer[ed] clear of the CFAA’s legislative history” in interpreting the statute’s unauthorized access
provisions.31
B. The Broad Approach
This Part examines the broad-approach side of the CFAA unauthorized access circuit split. Part II.B.1 offers an overview of
the purpose-focused nature of the inquiry, with Part II.B.2 diving
deeper into the question of how broad-approach courts determine
whether a given purpose is authorized. Part II.B.3 then evaluates
the benefits and drawbacks of this approach.
1. A purpose-focused inquiry.
The First,32 Fifth,33 Seventh,34 and Eleventh35 Circuits have
adopted a broad interpretation of the CFAA’s unauthorized access
provisions. According to this view, the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions necessitate a purpose-focused inquiry into access—in other words, focusing on whether the accesser accessed
a given computer for a purpose authorized by the computer
owner.36 Thus, under the broad approach, the fact that an individual has been granted general permission to access a computer
does not necessarily insulate him from CFAA unauthorized access liability.37
A brief example helps to illustrate the broad approach’s implications. CFAA unauthorized access cases often arise in the
employer-employee context,38 with a typical fact pattern involving
“simplify the language” of the 1984 Act), with id at 21 (additional views of Sens Mathias
and Leahy) (stating that the amendment would remove from the CFAA’s scope “authorized
access that aims at purposes to which such authorization does not extend”) (quotation
marks omitted).
31 Rosen, Note, 27 Berkeley Tech L J at 744–45 (cited in note 23). For additional
discussion of the various conflicting purposes underlying the CFAA, see Urban, Note, 52
Wm & Mary L Rev at 1382–92 (cited in note 19).
32 EF Cultural Travel BV v Explorica, Inc, 274 F3d 577, 582–84 & n 10 (1st Cir 2001).
33 United States v John, 597 F3d 263, 271–72 (5th Cir 2010).
34 International Airport Centers, LLC v Citrin, 440 F3d 418, 420 (7th Cir 2006).
35 United States v Rodriguez, 628 F3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir 2010).
36 See, for example, John, 597 F3d at 272 (stating that “[a]ccess to a computer and
data that can be obtained from that access may be exceeded if the purposes for which
access has been given are exceeded”).
37 See, for example, Rodriguez, 628 F3d at 1263 (government employee had general
permission to access a database, but was still found liable under the CFAA on the theory
that his permission to access the database did not extend to “nonbusiness reasons”).
38 See, for example, id at 1260 (federal government employee); John, 597 F3d at 269
(financial institution employee); Citrin, 440 F3d at 419 (real estate business employee).
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some variation of the following chronology: (1) Alpha Company
grants employee Jim access to its Database, (2) Jim signs an
employment agreement agreeing to only use the Database for
business purposes, (3) Jim uses the Database for nonbusiness
purposes, and (4) Alpha files suit under the CFAA.39 A broadapproach court would likely hold that Jim violated the CFAA by
exceeding authorized access—while Jim had general permission
to access the Database, his access for nonbusiness purposes exceeded the scope of this access authorization. In other words, Jim
had permission to access the Database, but used that permission
for an unauthorized purpose.
2. What purposes are authorized?
As the above example illustrates, the broad approach hinges
on a purpose-based inquiry, asking whether the accesser accessed
the computer for a purpose authorized by the computer owner.
However, broad-approach courts have adopted differing methods
for determining what purposes are authorized in a given scenario.
Generally, the broad-approach courts agree that an individual engages in unauthorized access when he accesses a computer
for a purpose that the computer owner expressly prohibited.
United States v Rodriguez40 paradigmatically illustrates this approach. In Rodriguez, the Eleventh Circuit held that a Social Security Administration (SSA) employee violated the CFAA by accessing SSA databases for nonbusiness purposes (in this case,
gathering personal information about various women in order to
harass them).41 In reaching this conclusion, the court claimed to
rely on a plain-language interpretation of the CFAA.42 The SSA,
the court noted, maintained a policy prohibiting the nonbusiness
use of its databases and communicated this policy to employees
through training sessions and notices.43 Rodriguez’s authorization to use these databases, then, extended to business uses

39 A private right of action for monetary damages or injunctive relief is available to
“[a]ny person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of [the CFAA]. 18 USC
§ 1030(g).” This hypothetical roughly approximates the facts of John, 597 F3d at 269;
Rodriguez, 628 F3d at 1260–62; and Valle, 807 F3d at 512–13.
40 628 F3d 1258 (11th Cir 2010).
41 Id at 1260–63.
42 Id at 1263 (arguing that “the plain language of the [CFAA] forecloses any argument that Rodriguez did not exceed his authorized access”).
43 Id at 1260.
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only.44 Thus, by accessing the databases for nonbusiness purposes, Rodriguez necessarily exceeded his authorized access.45
Some broad-approach courts have gone further, holding that
an individual need not violate an expressly communicated purpose limitation (such as the policy in Rodriguez) in order to engage in CFAA unauthorized access. Rather, under this view,
courts treat certain access purposes as presumptively unauthorized. The First Circuit offered an early version of this theory in
EF Cultural Travel BV v Explorica, Inc,46 which involved a tour
company (Explorica) deploying a custom computer program to
“scrape” publicly available pricing information from a competitor’s (EF Cultural Travel’s) website and then using that information to systematically undercut EF’s tour prices.47 There, the
court concluded that Explorica’s activities likely exceeded its authorized access to EF’s website.48 Though EF’s website did not
contain any explicit statement prohibiting website users from extracting the site’s publicly available data,49 the court nonetheless
concluded that such a use of the website was beyond the scope of
what EF would have authorized, reasoning that Explorica’s use
of the EF website “reek[ed]” of unauthorized access.50
The Fifth Circuit expanded on this theory in United States v
John,51 in which the court held that Dimetriace Eva-Lavon John,
a Citigroup employee, violated the CFAA when she used her access to customer-account information to convey that information
to her half brother, who used it to make fraudulent charges.52 The
court advanced two lines of argument in justifying this conclusion. First, it adopted a plain-language approach similar to that
44

Rodriguez, 628 F3d at 1263.
Id.
46 274 F3d 577 (1st Cir 2001).
47 Id at 579–80, 583.
48 Id at 582–84. This decision arrived in the First Circuit on appeal from a preliminary injunction that the district court granted against Explorica. Id at 580. Thus, the court
did not rule on the merits of the CFAA unauthorized access issue, stating only that EF
was “likely to prove such excessive access.” Id at 582.
49 See id at 580 & n 6 (noting that the EF website included a copyright symbol, but
describing no additional notice prohibiting data scraping).
50 EF Cultural Travel, 274 F3d at 583. The court focused on two factors: (1) that Explorica had used an automated data-scraper tool to extract the relevant data; and (2) that
that tool was built with proprietary information from a former EF employee. See id. These
two realities, the court reasoned, distinguished the instant case from a situation in which,
for instance, Explorica had simply manually extracted information from the website
through repeated searches. Id.
51 597 F3d 263 (5th Cir 2010).
52 Id at 269.
45
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employed in Rodriguez, holding that an employer can limit an employee’s authorization to use a computer to specific purposes.53
Under this standard, John’s actions clearly exceeded her authorized access—the court noted that Citigroup maintained policies
prohibiting the misuse of customer information and communicated those policies to employees through training programs
(which John attended).54 Second, the court justified its decision on
a broader reasoning, suggesting that John’s access of the database to perpetrate fraud was presumptively unauthorized. Citing
an earlier Fifth Circuit decision55 for the proposition that courts
have analyzed an individual’s access authorization through the
prism of a computer’s “expected norms of intended use,” the court
concluded that John’s access was necessarily unauthorized—
surely, perpetrating fraud was not an intended use of the
Citigroup database.56 Moreover, the court argued, even in the absence of an express employer policy prohibiting database misuse,
John presumably “ha[d] reason to know” that she was not authorized to access customer information in service of a fraud scheme.57
Finally, the Seventh Circuit has adopted the most expansive
view of the broad approach, relying on common-law agency principles to hold that an employee’s mere acquisition of “adverse interests” is sufficient to strip him of authorization to access the
employer’s computers.58 Thus, in International Airport Centers,
LLC v Citrin,59 the Seventh Circuit held that an employee who
decided to quit his job and proceeded to delete data on his
company-provided laptop violated the CFAA.60 In the court’s view,
the employee’s decision to quit his job and delete the files
breached his duty of loyalty to his employer, thereby “terminat[ing] his agency relationship . . . and with it his authority to
access the laptop.”61 Given the breadth of this agency-theory

53 Id at 272 (stating that “[a]ccess to a computer and data that can be obtained from
that access may be exceeded if the purposes for which access has been given are exceeded”).
54 Id.
55 See generally United States v Phillips, 477 F3d 215 (5th Cir 2007).
56 John, 597 F3d at 271–72. The court also approvingly cited the First Circuit’s idea
that certain accesses may simply “reek[ ]” of unauthorized use. Id at 272, citing EF
Cultural Travel, 274 F3d at 583.
57 John, 597 F3d at 273.
58 Citrin, 440 F3d at 420–21.
59 440 F3d 418 (7th Cir 2006).
60 Id at 419–21.
61 Id at 420–21.
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interpretation, it is perhaps unsurprising that courts have largely
not adopted the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning.62
3. Benefits and drawbacks of the broad approach.
The broad approach allows the CFAA to address an expansive range of computer-based misconduct. One could argue that
this broader read of the CFAA is necessary in the face of modern
computer crime, which is not limited to the archetypical hacker
threat that the statute was originally intended to address. Indeed, modern computer criminals often take the form of “insider
threats”—for example, employees utilizing their granted access to
undermine their employers’ interests. Thus, the broad approach
allows organizations to more effectively enforce proper use of
their computer systems and thereby protect their proprietary
information.63
Courts and commentators have criticized the broad approach,
however, for essentially allowing private entities to determine
what constitutes a CFAA violation. The broad approach is notable
in that it allows employment contracts, confidentiality agreements, terms-of-service (TOS) agreements, and similar documents to define the boundaries of authorized access.64 For instance, under the broad approach, a website owner could
theoretically render a given use unauthorized, without any notice
to users, merely by changing its TOS agreement.65 Thus, commentators have suggested that the broad approach may render the
CFAA unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, necessitating the
adoption of the narrow approach.66

62 See Annie Lee, Note, Algorithmic Auditing and Competition Under the CFAA: The
Revocation Paradigm of Interpreting Access and Authorization, 33 Berkeley Tech L J 1307,
1313 & n 36 (2018).
63 Though trade secret law may offer some help in this context, it is far from a perfect
solution. Specifically, the type of information stolen by an insider may fail a trade secret
statute’s economic-value or secrecy-measure requirements, particularly if it is stored on a
shared database. For additional discussion of the intersection between trade secret law
and the CFAA, see note 117.
64 See, for example, EF Cultural Travel, 274 F3d at 583–84 (confidentiality agreement); John, 597 F3d at 272–73 (official company policy, reinforced through training
programs).
65 See United States v Nosal, 676 F3d 854, 862 (9th Cir 2012) (en banc) (Nosal I)
(noting that “website owners retain the right to change the terms [of service] at any time
and without notice”).
66 See Jensen, Comment, 36 Hamline L Rev at 84 (cited in note 19) (arguing that
“[o]nly a narrow interpretation of the CFAA keeps the statute constitutional”).
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As Part III will illustrate, the AGR Framework is responsive
to the broad approach’s goal of allowing computer owners to protect their systems. The Framework’s third step, focused on permission revocation, provides a mechanism by which computer
owners can achieve this objective: If a computer owner does not
like how an accesser is utilizing his granted access, then the
owner can simply revoke that accesser’s permission and then
bring a CFAA action in response to any future accesses. At the
same time, however, the Framework imposes important limitations on CFAA liability—for instance, by clearly limiting CFAA
unauthorized access liability to private computers (via Step 1)
and requiring that revocations under Step 3 be affirmatively
made by the computer owner (rather than simply conveyed in, for
example, a TOS modification). These limitations, in turn, protect
the Framework from the overbreadth criticisms frequently levied
against the broad approach.
C. The Narrow Approach
This Section explores the narrow approach to CFAA unauthorized access. Part II.C.1 examines the permission-focused inquiry at the heart of the narrow approach, while Part II.C.2 discusses the approach’s benefits and drawbacks.
1. A permission-focused inquiry.
The Second,67 Fourth,68 and Ninth69 Circuits have adopted a
narrow interpretation of the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions.70 Under this interpretation, unauthorized access occurs
only when an individual accesses a computer that he does not
have permission to access. In other words, the accesser’s purpose
is irrelevant—according to the narrow approach, individuals do
not violate the CFAA merely by using their granted access
permission for purposes that contravene organizational policies71
or violate their duty of loyalty to an employer.72 Therefore, under
the hypothetical discussed at the beginning of Part II.B.1, a
67

Valle, 807 F3d at 524–28.
WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v Miller, 687 F3d 199, 204–06 (4th Cir 2012).
69 Nosal I, 676 F3d at 862–63.
70 It is worth noting that this interpretation seems relatively ascendant. All of the
narrow-approach opinions discussed in this Section were issued in 2012 or later, whereas
all of the broad-approach decisions discussed in Part II.B were issued in 2010 or earlier.
71 But see John, 597 F3d at 272; Rodriguez, 628 F3d at 1260.
72 But see Citrin, 440 F3d at 420–21.
68
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narrow-approach court would find that Jim did not violate the
CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions. Alpha Company had
granted Jim permission to access its Database, and that fact is
sufficient to result in a finding of no unauthorized access under
the narrow approach.
Accordingly, the narrow-approach inquiry focuses on permission, asking whether the accesser had permission to access (or
“validly accessed”) the computer in question.73 Thus, the narrow
approach, in contrast to the broad approach, greatly minimizes
the relevance of the employee’s access purpose, so long as the employee had general permission to access the computer. For example, in United States v Nosal74 (Nosal I), the Ninth Circuit held
that no CFAA unauthorized access occurred when employees of
Korn/Ferry (an executive search firm) removed information from
Korn/Ferry’s confidential databases and passed that information
to David Nosal, a former employee looking to start a competing
business, even though such actions clearly violated company policies.75 Similarly, in United States v Valle,76 the Second Circuit
held that Gilberto Valle (a New York City Police Department officer) did not violate the CFAA when he used his access to law
enforcement databases to view information about a woman he
had discussed kidnapping as part of his involvement in an online
sex fetish community, even though such access contravened
NYPD policies limiting database access to law enforcement
purposes.77
In reaching these conclusions, the narrow-approach courts
relied primarily on the rule of lenity.78 This principle of statutory
interpretation requires that courts interpret ambiguous criminal
laws narrowly, so as to “provide fair warning of what constitutes
criminal conduct, minimize[ ] the risk of selective or arbitrary enforcement, and strike[ ] the appropriate balance between the legislature and the court in defining criminal liability.”79 The CFAA’s
73

Miller, 687 F3d at 204.
676 F3d 854 (9th Cir 2012) (en banc).
75 Id at 856, 864. The Fourth Circuit reached a similar conclusion on similar facts in
Miller. See Miller, 687 F3d at 202, 206.
76 807 F3d 508 (2d Cir 2015).
77 Id at 512–13, 523–28. Notably, the court held that Valle’s discussions of kidnapping the woman in question represented mere fantasizing, and thus did not rise to the
level of conspiracy to kidnap. See id at 511. Thus, this case is distinguishable from John,
in which the alleged unauthorized access was in service of a broader criminal scheme. See
John, 597 F3d at 269–70 (applying the broad approach).
78 See Nosal I, 676 F3d at 863; Miller, 687 F3d at 205–06; Valle, 807 F3d at 523.
79 Valle, 807 F3d at 523.
74
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text and legislative history, these courts reason, can plausibly be
read as ambiguous (though individual courts differ somewhat regarding the precise degree of that ambiguity).80 Given an ambiguous statute, then, the rule of lenity demands an interpretation
that restricts said statute’s scope of liability.81
The permission-centric nature of the narrow approach has
the corresponding effect of diminishing the importance, for CFAA
unauthorized access purposes, of use-restriction policies—for example, employment agreements, information-technology use policies, TOS agreements, and other documents describing how an
individual may use a computer. Indeed, narrow-approach courts
have essentially rejected the notion (suggested by broad-approach
cases like John and Rodriguez) that an individual can engage in
unauthorized access merely by violating a use-restriction policy.82
2. Benefits and drawbacks of the narrow approach.
From the perspective of a computer owner looking to protect
his computer from malevolent actors, the narrow approach is undoubtedly problematic. After all, by removing purpose from the
unauthorized access inquiry, the narrow approach curtails the
CFAA’s applicability to individuals who use their granted access
permissions to engage in conduct contrary to the computer
owner’s interests. Indeed, in narrow-approach cases, the accesser
often acts in knowing violation of express employer prohibitions.83
Under the broad approach, such actions would almost certainly
result in CFAA liability. However, under the narrow approach,
the malicious purpose of the access simply does not matter—in

80 Nosal I and Miller reason that the CFAA’s text and legislative history support a
narrower reading of the Act, even without the rule of lenity. Nosal I, 676 F3d at 863 (framing the narrow approach as a “more sensible reading of the text and legislative history of
a statute whose general purpose is to punish hacking”); Miller, 687 F3d at 207 (expressing
an unwillingness “to contravene Congress’s intent by transforming a statute meant to target hackers into a vehicle for imputing liability to workers who access computers or information in bad faith”). In contrast, Valle offers a more ambivalent view of the text and
legislative history’s clarity. Valle, 807 F3d at 524 (asserting that the CFAA’s text is “readily susceptible to different interpretations”); id at 526 (finding “support in the legislative
history for both” the broad and narrow approaches).
81 See, for example, Valle, 807 F3d at 523 (concluding that “the rule of lenity requires
us to adopt the defendant’s [narrow] construction”).
82 See, for example, United States v Nosal, 844 F3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir 2016)
(Nosal II) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has “held that authorization is not pegged to website terms and conditions”).
83 See, for example, Nosal I, 676 F3d at 856 & n 1; Miller, 687 F3d at 202; Valle, 807
F3d at 513.
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the view of these courts, the fact that an individual has permission to access a computer is sufficient to shield them from CFAA
unauthorized access liability.
Courts adopting a narrow view of CFAA unauthorized access
have justified their approach as helping to limit the scope of the
CFAA to that of an “anti-hacking statute,” rather than “an expansive misappropriation statute.”84 As suggested above, narrowapproach courts view this limitation of the CFAA’s scope as necessitated by a combination of the rule of lenity and the statute’s
text and legislative history. As an initial matter, narrow-approach courts are generally sympathetic to a reading of the
CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions as being specifically focused on the hacker threat.85 However, these courts also argue
that, even if it is conceded that the CFAA’s text and legislative
history is ambiguous, the rule of lenity dictates a narrower interpretation to avoid turning vast swaths of relatively innocent behavior (like checking personal emails on a work computer) into
federal crimes “simply because a computer is involved.”86
This goal of limiting the CFAA’s scope is one served by the
AGR Framework presented in Part III.B. Steps 2 and 3 of the
Framework focus expressly on the granting and revocation of permission, heavily drawing upon the logic of the narrow-approach
cases. Moreover, the Framework, leveraging the concept of the
public/private computer distinction, extends the logic of the narrow approach to conclude that CFAA unauthorized access cannot
occur in the context of a computer that is publicly available.
D. Additional Concepts
Not all CFAA unauthorized access cases can be neatly categorized into the broad- or narrow-approach frameworks. The
cases detailed in the previous two sections predominantly took
place in the employer-employee context and hinged on analyses
of access purpose (for the broad approach) or access permission
(for the narrow approach). However, in recent years, circuit courts
have decided CFAA unauthorized access cases that took place
outside of the employment context and involved analytical considerations other than those of access purpose and access

84

Nosal I, 676 F3d at 857.
See, for example, id at 858–59 (characterizing the CFAA’s scope as focused
primarily on computer hacking).
86 Id at 860.
85
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permission. In adjudicating these cases, courts have articulated
two concepts—revocation and the public/private computer distinction—that earlier discussions of the CFAA unauthorized access circuit split largely ignored. The AGR Framework explained
in Part III.B incorporates these concepts into its analytical approach, thus filling a key gap in existing CFAA unauthorized access jurisprudence.
The sections below explore both of these concepts in greater
depth. Part II.D.1 discusses the concept of authorization revocation, in particular focusing on initial steps that the Ninth Circuit
has taken to define how such revocation can be effectuated.
Part II.D.2 examines the distinction between public and private
computers, and explores how the CFAA’s unauthorized access
provisions may apply differently to each type of computer.
1. Revocation.
The cases discussed in Parts II.B and II.C offer extensive discussion of what makes a given access authorized, but largely ignore the question of whether and how such authorization can be
terminated. However, the Ninth Circuit has recently outlined a
theory of CFAA authorization revocation, which Step 3 of the
AGR Framework largely adopts. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit
has stated that (1) an individual’s authorization to access a computer can be revoked and (2) postrevocation attempts to access
that computer, whether through a third party or “technological
gamesmanship,” can constitute CFAA unauthorized access.87
United States v Nosal88 (Nosal II) offers an application of the
Ninth Circuit’s revocation theory. This case involved the same
parties as Nosal I.89 By the time of Nosal II, Nosal and two of his
accomplices (Becky Christian and Mark Jacobson) had left
Korn/Ferry, and Korn/Ferry had revoked their computer access
credentials.90 However, Christian and Jacobson subsequently borrowed credentials from Nosal’s former executive assistant and
used those credentials to extract information from Korn/Ferry’s
computer systems.91 The court held that this conduct constituted
access “‘without authorization’ in violation of the CFAA.”92
87
88
89
90
91
92

Facebook, Inc v Power Ventures, Inc, 844 F3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir 2016).
844 F3d 1024 (9th Cir 2016).
See text accompanying notes 74–75.
Nosal II, 844 F3d at 1029, 1031.
Id.
Id at 1038.

1456

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1437

Specifically, applying its revocation model, the court held that
(1) Korn/Ferry’s revocation of Nosal, Christian, and Jacobson’s
access credentials “unequivocally conveyed” that they had “no authorization to access Korn/Ferry’s computer system,”93 and
(2) their subsequent use of the executive assistant’s login credentials to access Korn/Ferry’s databases therefore amounted to
CFAA unauthorized access.94
Facebook, Inc v Power Ventures, Inc,95 decided one week after
Nosal II, expanded on the Ninth Circuit’s revocation model by
identifying additional mechanisms (namely, cease-and-desist letters and technical countermeasures) through which authorization
can be revoked. In Power Ventures, the court considered a case
involving Facebook and Power.com, a rival social media site
whose business model essentially consisted of allowing users to
aggregate their various social media profiles on a single platform.96 Power launched a promotional campaign that allowed its
users to promote Power by clicking a button on its website that,
in turn, automatically created a post on the user’s Facebook profile.97 Facebook responded by sending Power a “cease and desist
letter” and implementing an Internet Protocol (IP) block “to prevent Power from accessing the Facebook website.”98 Power ignored the cease-and-desist letter and technically circumvented
the IP block, thereby allowing it to continue its campaign.99 The
court held that Facebook’s cease-and-desist letter constituted a
revocation of authorization,100 and noted that the IP block “further
demonstrated that Facebook had rescinded permission for Power

93

Id at 1036.
Nosal II, 844 F3d at 1038. The court also rejected the relevance of the executive
assistant having voluntarily provided her access credentials to Christian and Jacobson,
stating that she “had no mantle or authority to override Korn/Ferry’s authority to control
access to its computers.” Id at 1035.
95 844 F3d 1058 (9th Cir 2016).
96 Id at 1062.
97 Id at 1063.
98 Id.
99 Power Ventures, 844 F3d at 1063.
100 Id at 1069.
94
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to access Facebook’s computers.”101 Thus, the court concluded,
Power violated the CFAA by engaging in subsequent access.102
2. The public/private computer distinction.
The canonical broad- and narrow-approach cases primarily
occurred in the employment context, and thus involved what
could be characterized as private computers—those not available
to the general public.103 Common sense would suggest that the
concept of unauthorized access would apply differently to computers that are publicly accessible. Indeed, some courts have adopted
this view, holding that public computers cannot be subject to unauthorized access, a premise that Step 1 of the AGR Framework
adopts as well.
For example, in Pulte Homes, Inc v Laborers’ International
Union of North America,104 the Sixth Circuit held that a labor union did not engage in access “without authorization” when it
“bombarded” a construction company’s public-facing email system with thousands of emails.105 In so concluding, the court relied
primarily on the publicly accessible nature of the computers in
question—in other words, because the company’s email systems
were open to the public (accessible without the need to use, for
example, a password), the union had authorization to access
them, even if such access was contrary to the construction company’s interests.106

101 Id at 1068. In a footnote, the court cautioned that “[s]imply bypassing an IP address, without more, would not constitute unauthorized use,” noting the possibility that a
blocked user might not realize that he has been blocked, or that he may discover the block
and “conclude that it was triggered by misconduct by someone else who shares the same
IP address, such as [his] roommate or co-worker.” Id at 1068 n 5. Thus, the court seemed
to imply that an IP block must be accompanied by some more explicit form of notice (like
a cease-and-desist letter) in order to constitute a valid revocation of authorization.
102 Id at 1068.
103 It is true that EF Cultural Travel involved scraping data from a publicly available
website. However, that case also involved an allegation that the relevant data-scraping
tool was based, in part, on confidential information that a former EF employee had provided to Explorica. See EF Cultural Travel, 274 F3d at 583. This fact thus distinguishes
EF Cultural Travel from the two cases discussed in this Section, neither of which involve
any claimed misuse of confidential information.
104 648 F3d 295 (6th Cir 2011).
105 Id at 299, 304. The construction company raised its unauthorized access claim under 18 USC § 1030(a)(5)(B) and (C), both of which criminalize only access “without authorization.” Id at 300. Thus, the court left open the question of whether the union “exceed[ed]
authorized access” under the CFAA. See id at 304.
106 Id at 304.
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The Ninth Circuit applied a similar distinction between public and private computers in hiQ Labs, Inc v LinkedIn Corp,107 a
recent case involving a dispute between LinkedIn and hiQ, a company that generates data-analytics products based on information it scrapes from LinkedIn users’ public profiles.108 This case
reached the Ninth Circuit on appeal from a preliminary injunction (hiQ sought to enjoin LinkedIn from denying it access to the
aforementioned profiles), and so the court did not resolve on the
merits the issue of whether hiQ’s activities constituted CFAA
unauthorized access.109 However, in affirming hiQ’s sought-after
injunction, the court strongly suggested that hiQ’s scraping of
public LinkedIn data, even after receipt of LinkedIn’s cease-anddesist letter, would not constitute access “without authorization.”110 The key factor driving this conclusion, the court reasoned,
was the publicly accessible nature of the scraped data. The data
available on public LinkedIn profiles, the court pointed out, “is
not owned by LinkedIn and has not been demarcated by LinkedIn
as private using” a system “such as username and password requirements.”111 Rather, it is “available to anyone with a web
browser.”112 These factors, the court concluded, thus strongly suggest that hiQ’s scraping activities do not run afoul of the CFAA’s
unauthorized access provisions.113
Thus, the current state of the CFAA unauthorized access circuit split is essentially as follows: The broad and narrow approaches articulate competing visions of the CFAA unauthorized
access inquiry. On the one hand, broad-approach courts employ a
purpose-focused inquiry, asking whether an access was made for
a purpose authorized by the computer owner, thereby giving computer owners more effective control over the use of their systems.
On the other hand, narrow-approach courts, seeking to limit the
CFAA’s punitive scope, advance a permission-focused inquiry,
discarding access purpose and focusing solely on whether the

107

938 F3d 985 (9th Cir 2019), petition for cert filed (Mar 9, 2020).
Id at 991.
109 Id at 989.
110 Id at 1003–04.
111 hiQ Labs, 938 F3d at 1003–04.
112 Id at 1002.
113 Id at 1003–04. The nature of the data involved also distinguishes hiQ Labs from
Power Ventures, which involved Power’s access to nonpublic Facebook data. Compare hiQ
Labs, 938 F3d at 1002, with Power Ventures, 844 F3d at 1063 (“Facebook has tried to limit
and control access to its website . . . [and] requires third-party developers or websites that
wish to contact its users through its site to enroll in a program called Facebook Connect.”).
108
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accesser had general permission to access the information in
question. However, several recent cases have discussed concepts—namely, authorization revocation and the public/private
computer distinction—that have gone relatively unexamined
within the canonical circuit-split cases.
The result of all this is a muddled assortment of competing
frameworks, concepts, and interests. Given this reality, how can
courts evaluate CFAA unauthorized access in a manner that is
both consistent with the Act’s text and purpose, but also applicable to the increasingly diverse contexts in which parties invoke
the Act’s unauthorized access provisions? Part III provides an
answer.
III. SOLUTION: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING CFAA
UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS
This Part describes, applies, and assesses this Comment’s
Available-Granted-Revoked Framework. To begin, Part III.A establishes the need for a solution to the unauthorized access circuit
split. Then, Part III.B describes each of the Framework’s three
analytical steps—whether the computer is publicly available or
private, whether the computer owner has granted access permission to the accesser, and whether the computer owner has revoked
that permission. Next, Part III.C applies the Framework against
several example fact patterns, demonstrating the analytical clarity that courts applying the Framework will bring to bear on a
range of challenging scenarios. Finally, Part III.D evaluates the
drawbacks and benefits of the Framework, ultimately concluding
that the latter far outweigh the former.
A. The Need for a Solution
Before describing the Framework’s specific components, it is
important to establish why a solution to the unauthorized access
circuit split is even necessary in the first place. This Section provides answers to this question. To that end, Part III.A.1 summarizes the current state of CFAA case law, characterized by a persistent circuit split and a growing application of the unauthorized
access provisions to new factual contexts. Part III.A.2 then outlines the unique role that the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions play in punishing a specific type of computer-related misdeed, and why alternative legal frameworks (such as trade secret
law and contract causes of action) cannot fill that role.
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1. The continued circuit split and growing application of
the unauthorized access provisions in nonemployment
contexts.
A survey of existing case law and commentary addressing
CFAA unauthorized access yields two observations. First, the
meanings of the terms “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access” remain subject to an active circuit split,114 though
the narrow approach appears to be gaining traction in more recent cases.115 Second, much of the relevant case law operates
within the employment context, typically dealing with situations
in which an employee uses granted computer access for purposes
contrary to those of his employer. Undoubtedly, unauthorized access issues are prevalent in this arena. However, as Part II.D
noted, the unauthorized access issue is becoming increasingly
prominent in nonemployment contexts. These cases, in turn,
apply novel concepts, like revocation and the public/private
computer distinction, that the employment cases have largely
ignored.116
These observations suggest the potential utility of a new approach to addressing CFAA unauthorized access issues—one that
reconciles the two sides of the existing circuit split and resolves
disputes in both the employment and nonemployment contexts.
The AGR Framework offers precisely such an approach.
2. Continued relevance of the CFAA unauthorized access
provisions.
Of course, it is worth considering whether a solution to the
unauthorized access circuit split is even necessary. After all,
the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions are not the sole
mechanism through which individuals can be punished for
114 As stated in note 22, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Nosal II and Power
Ventures. See Nosal v United States, 138 S Ct 314 (2017); Power Ventures, Inc v Facebook,
Inc, 138 S Ct 313 (2017). However, it recently granted certiorari in United States v Van
Buren, 940 F3d 1192 (11th Cir 2019), cert granted, 2020 WL 1906566, in which the defendant essentially sought to overrule the Eleventh Circuit’s prior decision in Rodriguez.
See Van Buren, 940 F3d at 1207. In addition, as of May 3, 2020, a certiorari petition remains pending with regards to hiQ Labs.
115 As discussed in note 70, all of the narrow-approach decisions were issued in 2012
or later, whereas all of the broad-approach decisions were issued in 2010 or earlier.
116 See, for example, Power Ventures, 844 F3d at 1066–68; Pulte Homes, 648 F3d at
303; United States v Drew, 259 FRD 449, 461–62 (CD Cal 2009) (concluding “that an intentional breach of [the terms of service] can potentially constitute accessing the MySpace
computer/server without authorization and/or in excess of authorization”).
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computer-related misdeeds. For example, CFAA unauthorized access cases often involve claims associated with trade secret misappropriation,117 employment-related causes of action (such as
breach of contract claims),118 and CFAA provisions not involving
unauthorized access.119 In light of this reality, why not simply allow unauthorized access cases to be governed by the legal frameworks of these alternative causes of action?
Such an approach is tempting, but ultimately unsatisfying.
Though the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions overlap with
other legal frameworks, they are unique in their focus on allowing
computer owners to protect the integrity of their systems. Unlike
trade secret laws (activated only when the information in question is a trade secret) or contract causes of action (requiring a contractual relationship), the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions
alone police the specific act of an unauthorized access to a computer. For this reason, the unauthorized access provisions are
worth saving.

117 See, for example, Nosal I, 676 F3d at 856 (noting that “[t]he government indicted
Nosal on twenty counts, including trade secret theft, mail fraud, conspiracy and violations
of the CFAA”) (emphasis added). Trade secret misappropriation may occur as a result of a
CFAA unauthorized access—for example, if an employee engages in an unauthorized access and then steals a trade secret. However, in order for such a theft to constitute trade
secret misappropriation, the information stolen must actually be a trade secret, a legal
term of art governed by specific requirements. For instance, the Economic Espionage Act
of 1996 states that, in order for information to be a trade secret, it must “derive[ ] independent economic value . . . from not being generally known,” and be protected by “reasonable measures to keep [the] information secret.” 18 USC § 1839. Thus, the fact that an
individual steals company information through a CFAA unauthorized access does not necessarily mean that the individual engaged in trade secret misappropriation.
The shortcomings of trade secret law are further highlighted by the fact that many
CFAA unauthorized access cases involve information stored on shared databases. See, for
example, Nosal I, 676 F3d at 856. This reality can make it difficult for employers to establish that they took reasonable measures to preserve the secrecy of the information in question. See Danielle J. Reid, Note, Combating the Enemy Within: Regulating Employee Misappropriation of Business Information, 71 Vand L Rev 1033, 1047 (2018). For additional
information about the legal frameworks surrounding trade secrets and the protection of
business information, see id at 1041–49.
118 See, for example, American Furukawa, Inc v Hossain, 103 F Supp 3d 864, 866 (ED
Mich 2015); Estes Forwarding Worldwide LLC v Cuellar, 239 F Supp 3d 918, 920–21 (ED
Va 2017). See also Urban, Note, 52 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1396–97 (cited in note 19).
119 See, for example, 18 USC § 1030(a)(5)(A) (prescribing a punishment for individuals who, inter alia, knowingly transmit code that causes damage to a protected computer);
18 USC § 1030(a)(6) (prescribing a punishment for individuals who traffic passwords); 18
USC § 1030(a)(7)(A) (prescribing a punishment for individuals who transmit extortionary
communications threatening to damage a protected computer). The defendant in John was
convicted of charges under 18 USC § 1029, in addition to his CFAA charges. See John, 597
F3d at 283.
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B. Defining the Framework
The AGR Framework proposes that unauthorized access under the CFAA be evaluated using a three-step, sequential framework, summarized in the diagram below and explained in greater
detail beginning with Part III.B.1. Note that this Section’s discussion of each of these steps assumes a factual scenario in which X
accesses Y’s computer (including Y’s computer’s data).
FIGURE 1: THE AVAILABLE-GRANTED-REVOKED FRAMEWORK
Assume that X accesses Y’s computer. . .
STEP 1: Public vs. Private
Computer
Is Y’s computer publicly
available?

Yes

CONCLUDE ANALYSIS
No CFAA unauthorized access

No
STEP 2: Permission to Access
Has Y at any point granted permission to X to access Y’s computer?

No

CONCLUDE ANALYSIS
CFAA unauthorized access

Yes

STEP 3: Affirmative
Revocation
Has Y affirmatively revoked X’s
permission to access said computer (for example, through a
cease-and-desist letter or password revocation)?

No

CONCLUDE ANALYSIS
No CFAA unauthorized access

Yes
CONCLUDE ANALYSIS
CFAA unauthorized access

1. Public versus private computers.
This step considers whether Y’s computer is publicly available. If Y’s computer is publicly available, then the analysis concludes with a finding that X has not engaged in CFAA unauthorized access. If Y’s computer is not publicly available (in other
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words, if Y’s computer is a private computer), then the analysis
proceeds to Step 2.
Under this standard, a computer that is publicly available
cannot be subject to CFAA unauthorized access.120 Thus, this step
reflects the principle, advanced in Pulte Homes and hiQ Labs but
largely ignored in the employment-centric CFAA cases (where the
relevant computers are private), that public computers simply lie
outside the scope of the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions.121
Beyond aligning with the holdings of Pulte Homes and hiQ Labs,
this principle is likely consistent with most people’s normative intuitions. Simply put, it makes sense that computers made freely
available to the public cannot be accessed in an unauthorized
manner. Authorization, after all, implies a degree of control over
who accesses a computer, and if the entities controlling public
computers wanted to limit access, they would not have made
them public.
Courts should face minimal difficulties in differentiating between public and private computers. Specifically, courts could assess whether the computer is protected by access permissions
(such as username and password requirements).122 Given that
this step is intended largely as a threshold question to determine
whether the CFAA unauthorized access provisions apply, such a
limited inquiry is likely sufficient.
2. Permission to access.
This step considers whether Y has at any point granted X permission to access the computer. If so, then the analysis proceeds
to Step 3. If Y has never granted X permission to access the computer, then the analysis concludes with a finding of CFAA unauthorized access.
This step is intended to criminalize the actions of the classic
hacker, prohibiting an individual from accessing a private computer that he has never had permission to access. Given the

120 As discussed in Part I.B, the CFAA defines “computer” broadly, and courts have
treated websites and databases as computers for the purpose of assessing unauthorized
access.
121 See Pulte Homes, 648 F3d at 304; hiQ Labs, 938 F3d at 1003.
122 See, for example, hiQ Labs, 938 F3d at 1003 (asserting that the CFAA “without
authorization” provision is violated “when a person circumvents a computer’s generally
applicable rules regarding access permissions, such as username and password requirements, to gain access to a computer”).

1464

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1437

CFAA’s historical roots as an anti-hacking statute, it is important
that the Framework proscribe such behavior.
Granted, one could certainly imagine definitional issues arising as courts apply this step. For example, litigants may contest
the definition of permission. However, this concern can likely be
addressed by referring back to Step 1, which requires that a computer be protected by an access permission system (such as a
password) in order to qualify as a private computer protected by
the CFAA. Thus, Step 2 can, in turn, define “permission” as the
owner-granted ability to access a private computer. Similarly, litigants may challenge the scope of permissions granted. For example, if Y grants X permission to access a database with five components, a litigant may question which components X had
permission to access. The short answer, in keeping with Step 2’s
focus on addressing the hacker threat, is any component that X
was technically able to access, using his granted permissions.123
It is important to note that the Framework’s conception of
permission in Step 2 is one in which permission is bounded by
what the accesser is technically able to access. To return to Jim’s
case as an example, his permission to access a computer is defined
by what information he is technically able to access, not by what
Alpha Company says he can access. Thus, if Alpha tells Jim that
he can only access Database A, but the password that Alpha assigned Jim to use in accessing Database A also allows him to access Database B, then a court applying the AGR Framework
would find no unauthorized access for Jim’s access of Database B.
As this example illustrates, the scope of permission granted under Step 2 is primarily a question of what the accesser is technically able to access.
Granted, the AGR Framework’s conception of permission is
one that places a greater burden on the computer owner than does
the broad approach. However, this burden is a justified one. First,

123 It is worth briefly discussing the possibility of unintentionally granted permission.
One could imagine a scenario in which, for example, Y grants a group of individuals access
to a database, but accidentally includes X in that group. The Framework would treat this
as granted permission under Step 2. Broadly speaking, the Framework is intended as a
relatively objective approach to the issue of CFAA unauthorized access, rather than one
focused on the subjective perceptions of computer owners and accessers. For example, consider how Step 3’s revocation analysis, discussed below, eschews the amorphous agency
analysis of Citrin for more objective indicia of permission termination, such as cease-anddesist letters, password revocations, and technical countermeasures. See Citrin, 440 F3d
at 420–21. Thus, treating an accidental grant of permission as a valid grant of permission
aligns with the broader aims of the Framework.
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the Framework’s safeguard-focused conception of permission is
one that helps to facilitate notice to accessers. By requiring that
permission be bounded by technical safeguards, the Framework
avoids situations in which an individual is faced with CFAA liability for inadvertently accessing a computer that he does not
have express consent to access (for instance, if Jim accidentally
accessed Database B using the password that Alpha provided
him). Second, if computer owners want to deem certain computers
off-limits without implementing technical safeguards, they remain free to do so under the AGR Framework, albeit outside of
the CFAA’s protection. For instance, an employer could incorporate such limitations into its employment agreements. The AGR
Framework simply forecloses the possibility of such an agreement
then being used as the basis for criminal liability under the
CFAA.
3. Affirmative revocation.
The Framework’s final step considers whether Y has affirmatively revoked X’s permission to access the computer. If Y has
made an affirmative revocation, then the analysis concludes with
a finding of unauthorized access. If Y has not made an affirmative
revocation, then the analysis concludes with a finding of no unauthorized access.
This step, incorporating concepts articulated in Nosal II and
Power Ventures, is aimed at the actions of individuals who had
permission to access a computer, but had that access revoked by
the computer owner. Specifically, Step 3 provides the means for a
computer owner to “close[ ] both the front door and the back door”
to individuals that it no longer wants to have access to its computers, with former employees and cease-and-desist recipients being prime examples.124 Step 3 accomplishes this objective in a
manner that advances the goals of both the broad and narrow approaches. Consistent with the broad approach, Step 3 allows computer owners to control who has access to their computers. However, Step 3 also limits this power in two important ways.
First, Step 3 mandates the provision of notice to the unauthorized accesser. In order to establish an affirmative revocation,
the computer owner will have to clearly indicate to the accesser—
through measures either explicitly communicative (like a ceaseand-desist letter), technical (like an IP block), or a combination of
124

Nosal II, 844 F3d at 1028.
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both (like a password revocation)—that his access is no longer authorized.125 Under such a framework, the scope of impermissible
behavior becomes much clearer, for both the accessers and courts.
For instance, rather than engaging in a nebulous analysis of when
an employee acquires interests adverse to those of his employer
(as seen in cases like Citrin), courts will simply look to whether a
purportedly unauthorized access occurred after an affirmative
revocation took place.
Second, Step 3 avoids the “parade of horribles” often described by critics of the broad approach by removing access purpose from the CFAA unauthorized access inquiry.126 Thus, the employee who violates his company’s computer-use policy by playing
online sudoku and the online dater who breaches Tinder’s TOS
agreement by lying about his height would not face CFAA unauthorized access liability merely because their access was for an
impermissible purpose.127 In these cases, the computer owners
would be free to revoke the users’ access authorizations; however,
they could not dictate specific uses, at least in a manner enforceable by the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions.
A key point of contention in implementing this step will be
defining the parameters of “affirmative revocation.” The case law
suggests a few methods that would likely qualify, including ceaseand-desist letters128 and the revocation of login credentials.129
While a full-scale cataloguing of permissible methods of affirmative revocation lies outside the scope of this Comment, it stands
to reason that the incremental development of such parameters
lies well within the institutional competencies of the judiciary.
125 As Power Ventures suggests, a computer owner will ideally convey its revocation
of authorization through multiple avenues. See Power Ventures, 844 F3d at 1068 (noting
that Facebook’s imposition of an IP block on Power “further demonstrated” the revocation
of authorization conveyed by a cease-and-desist letter).
126 See Nosal I, 676 F3d at 860–62 (listing potential far-reaching negative consequences of the broad approach); id at 866 (Silverman dissenting) (describing the majority’s
list as a “parade of horribles”).
127 See id at 860–62 (majority) (describing how those hypotheticals would be treated
under the broad approach). This is not to say, of course, that the Framework would render
such company policies powerless. For example, the employee could still face workplace
sanctions, and the Tinder user could have his account suspended. The Framework merely
precludes the possibility of bringing CFAA charges against these individuals.
128 See, for example, Power Ventures, 844 F3d at 1067–68.
129 See, for example, Nosal II, 844 F3d at 1036. In addition, Power Ventures lends
some support to the idea that the imposition of technical countermeasures (such as IP
blocks) may indicate a revocation of permission, but suggests that such measures must be
accompanied by something “more” to communicate to the blocked party that it, specifically,
has been blocked. See Power Ventures, 844 F3d at 1068 & n 5.
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C. Applying the Framework
This Section applies the AGR Framework to several of the
cases discussed in Part II, with the goals of demonstrating how
courts would practically apply the Framework, comparing the
Framework’s results with those of the deciding courts, and discussing adjudicative challenges that courts implementing the
Framework would encounter. After a brief examination of the
classic hacking scenario in Part III.C.1, this Section proceeds to
evaluate the narrow-approach, revocation, and public-computer
cases in Part III.C.2, followed by the broad-approach cases in
Part III.C.3.
As this Section illustrates, application of the Framework generally yields results consistent with those in the narrowapproach, revocation, and public-computer cases. However, the
Framework’s results diverge from those in several of the broadapproach cases.
1. Classic hacking.
A court applying the Framework to a classic hacking case
would deem this scenario a CFAA unauthorized access. The computer in such a scenario would presumably be private (Step 1),
and the hacker presumably never had permission to access the
computer (Step 2). Given the outcome of Step 2, analysis of Step 3
would be unnecessary.
2. Narrow-approach, revocation, and public-computer
cases.
a) Nosal I. A court applying the Framework would find no
CFAA unauthorized access, consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s
conclusion. First, the confidential, password-protected Korn/
Ferry database would constitute a private computer. Second,
Nosal’s accomplices had permission to access the database, as
they were still Korn/Ferry employees at the time of the conduct
in question. Third, Korn/Ferry had not, at that point in time, revoked the accomplices’ access. Thus, a court would find no CFAA
unauthorized access.130
b) Power Ventures. A court applying the Framework would
find CFAA unauthorized access, consistent with the Ninth

130 See Nosal I, 676 F3d at 866. A court applying the Framework against the facts of
Valle would reach a similar result. See Part II.C.1.
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Circuit’s conclusion. As a threshold matter, the servers hosting
Facebook users’ password-protected profiles would constitute private computers.
Step 2’s permission analysis is more complex in Power
Ventures than in previous examples, as this case involved split
permissions, with two entities (Facebook itself and individual
Facebook users) conceivably having the ability to give Power permission to access the private computers in question.131 It seems
reasonable to conclude that Power had permission from
Facebook’s users to access their private profiles (a sentiment
shared by the Ninth Circuit),132 but no such permission from
Facebook itself. This, in turn, raises the question of whether an
entity (in this case, a Facebook user) that has permission to access
a computer (in this case, Facebook’s servers) can then provide permission to another entity (in this case, Power) to access that same
computer.133
Ultimately, it seems sensible to conclude that accessers who
have permission to access a computer from the computer’s owner
should not be able to transfer their permission to individuals to
whom the computer owner has not given permission. This conclusion is consistent with the Framework’s objective of allowing computer owners to control (to an extent) who is able to access their
computers. Allowing an authorized accesser (like the Facebook
users in Power Ventures or the executive assistant in Nosal II) to
grant access permission for a computer that they do not own
would seem fundamentally at odds with this objective—effectively diffusing the computer owner’s permission-granting power
to anyone to whom the owner has already granted permission.134
An analogy to a noncomputer context is illustrative. If I give you
a key to my house (in other words, permission to enter), surely I
have not automatically given you the authority to then extend
131

See Power Ventures, 844 F3d at 1068 (describing split permissions).
See id at 1067 (arguing that by clicking a button that allowed Power to disseminate messages through their Facebook profiles, the users “took action akin to allowing a
friend to use a computer or to log on to an e-mail account”). From this premise, the court
concluded that, because of the presumed permission from Facebook users, Power “reasonably could have thought” that it had permission to access Facebook’s computers. Id.
133 A similar fact pattern arose in Nosal II, in which Nosal argued that his former
executive assistant, by relaying her login credentials to his accomplices, had provided him
with authorization to access the Korn/Ferry databases. See Nosal II, 844 F3d at 1035–36.
134 Here, it is worth recalling that the CFAA defines “computer” as a physical device.
See 18 USC § 1030(e)(1). Thus, in a case like Power Ventures, the computer in question is
the server on which Facebook profiles are hosted, not the profile itself. Thus, Facebook,
not the Facebook user, is best characterized as the computer owner.
132
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that permission to other people without my knowledge. Allowing
split permissions would essentially result in this kind of problematic reality in the CFAA context.
Given the above, a court applying the Framework would hold
that Power did not have permission to access Facebook’s computers and therefore find CFAA unauthorized access. Even assuming
that Power had permission to access Facebook’s computers, however, Step 3 would still dictate a finding of unauthorized access,
as Facebook affirmatively revoked Power’s authorization by sending a cease-and-desist letter and implementing an IP block.
c) Nosal II. First, the relevant computer—Korn/Ferry’s
confidential database—is clearly a private computer. Second, the
accessers (in this case, Christian, Jacobson, and, by extension,
Nosal) at one point had permission to access these databases
while employed by Korn/Ferry. Third, however, Korn/Ferry had
affirmatively revoked these individuals’ access authorizations by
terminating their login credentials upon the end of their respective employments. Thus, a court applying the Framework would
find CFAA unauthorized access, consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion.
As an illustration of the Framework’s application, it is worth
considering how a court applying the Framework would adjudicate this case had Nosal’s executive assistant accessed the database herself (instead of providing her credentials to Nosal’s coconspirators) and extracted Korn/Ferry’s confidential information
to provide to Nosal and company. In this scenario, Steps 1 and 2
would be applied identically as compared to the actual facts—the
computer remains private and the accesser (the executive assistant, in this case) had permission to access the computer. However, Step 3 would come out differently—unlike Nosal, Christian,
and Jacobson, the executive assistant had not had her access to
the computer revoked, as she was still employed by Korn/Ferry.
Thus, the court would find no CFAA unauthorized access. While
this exposes the Framework to some of the same critiques leveled
at the Ninth Circuit’s actual approach (namely, focusing on the
puzzling notion that Nosal would be CFAA liable if he used the
executive assistant’s credentials to access the database himself,
but not if he directed the executive assistant to access the database and then relay him the relevant information),135 it is
135 See, for example, Jamie L. Williams, Automation Is Not “Hacking”: Why Courts
Must Reject Attempts to Use the CFAA as an Anti-Competitive Sword, 24 BU J Sci & Tech
L 416, 433 (2018).
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important to note that the executive assistant would still be subject to sanctions, whether criminal (for example, for theft of trade
secrets) or otherwise (for example, losing her job).
d) hiQ Labs and Pulte Homes. Neither of these cases
would proceed past Step 1, as both involved public computers
(publicly available LinkedIn profiles and a publicly available
email address, respectively).
3. Broad-approach cases.
a) Citrin. A court applying the Framework would find no
CFAA unauthorized access. First, the computer in Citrin (an
employer-provided laptop) is clearly a private computer. Second,
Citrin had permission to access this computer as part of his
employment. However, at the time of the alleged unauthorized
access (Citrin deleting data from the laptop), his employer had
not affirmatively revoked Citrin’s access to the laptop. Thus,
Step 3 of the Framework would dictate a finding of no CFAA unauthorized access.
This conclusion differs from that reached by the court in
Citrin. However, this divergence is not overly troubling—after all,
Citrin relied on an agency-theory justification that has been
largely limited to the Seventh Circuit.136
b) John. A court applying the Framework would find no
CFAA unauthorized access. First, the relevant computer (databases containing financial institution customer information) was
private. Second, John had permission to access this computer as
part of her employment by Citigroup. Third, Citigroup had not, at
the time of the relevant accesses by John, affirmatively revoked
John’s access—thus, Step 3 would dictate a finding of no unauthorized access.
Again, this conclusion departs from the holding of the deciding court. Critics of the Framework will highlight such a result as
absurd—after all, John was using company computers to further
a criminal fraud scheme.137 From a normative perspective, it
seems preposterous that such conduct should go unpunished.
However, such a critique is misleading, for John would not go unpunished. As the Fifth Circuit’s opinion made clear, John was also

136
137

See Lee, Note, 33 Berkeley Tech L J at 1313 (cited in note 62).
See John, 597 F3d at 269.
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convicted by a jury on an indictment including several counts pertaining to access-device fraud.138
This policy point is worth emphasizing. There will certainly
be situations in which the Framework will result in malicious actors not being punished under the CFAA’s unauthorized access
provisions. However, one need not worry that these actors will
escape entirely unpunished—in many such cases, those individuals will face other forms of criminal liability.139 Ultimately, the
CFAA offers a legal sanction uniquely focused on unauthorized
access, and it should not be stretched to function as a gratuitous
sentence enhancer for all criminals whose crimes happened to
involve a computer.140
c) EF Cultural Travel. Here, the relevant “computer” was
EF’s publicly available website. Thus, Step 1 would dictate a finding of no CFAA unauthorized access.141
D. Evaluating the Framework
The Framework is not a perfect solution to the CFAA unauthorized access dilemma. Though it undoubtedly advances the interests underlying both the broad and narrow approaches, it still,
in the end, represents a middle ground, and therefore entails certain compromises and tradeoffs. That being said, the Framework
offers benefits that outweigh the interests shortchanged by its analytical approach.
1. Framework drawbacks.
The Framework presents two drawbacks—namely, a lack of
consideration for access purpose and the need for additional definition of certain key concepts—that, while not crippling to its viability, merit further discussion.

138

Id.
See, for example, the legal frameworks discussed in Part III.A.2.
140 A court applying the Framework against the facts of Rodriguez would reach similar results as those reached in applying the Framework to the facts of John. See text accompanying notes 51–57.
141 This analysis is somewhat complicated by the fact that Explorica utilized nonpublic, confidential information from a former EF employee to more efficiently interpret information scraped from the site. However, this reality should not dictate an alternative
Step 1 conclusion. Step 1 is, after all, narrowly focused on the public/private nature of the
accessed computer (in this case, EF’s website). Instead, Explorica’s use of confidential information from the former EF employee could be addressed through mechanisms like
trade secret law or contract claims.
139
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First, the Framework removes analysis of access purpose
from the CFAA unauthorized access inquiry. In other words, in
considering whether X’s access of Y’s computer was authorized,
the Framework does not consider why X accessed Y’s computer.
As suggested above, this disregard for access purpose plays an
important role in helping to limit the scope of conduct criminalized by the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions. However, the
removal of access purpose as a factor of consideration is not without its downsides.
Primarily, its lack of consideration for access purpose means
that the Framework does not punish the actions of the “insider
threat”—an individual who has permission to access a private
computer but uses that access for purposes contrary to the computer owner’s interests. So long as computer owners do not affirmatively revoke insiders’ authorizations, insider access of said
computers, even for malicious purposes, would not run afoul of
the Framework. Given large organizations’ ever-growing reliance
on complicated information-technology infrastructures, the specter of the insider threat is a prominent one.142 In such a threat
environment, organizations would undoubtedly prefer to have the
CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions available to deter these
actors. Of course, the mere fact that computer owners would prefer more draconian criminal sanctions is an insufficient reason to
adopt an expansive interpretation of CFAA liability. Moreover, as
Part III.B illustrated, the Framework leaves computer owners
with mechanisms like permission revocation to control access to
their systems.
More generally, the Framework would allow certain normatively “bad” actors, like the fraudster in John or the harasser in
Rodriguez, to go unpunished, at least by the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions. However, as noted previously, it is important to recognize the CFAA’s inherent limitations. The Act is
not an all-purpose tool for punishing every instance of bad behavior that happens to involve a computer. Other legal avenues exist
to punish many of these bad actions.143 Moreover, under the
Framework, a computer owner always has the prerogative to terminate an objectionable use by affirmatively revoking an accesser’s authorization. And finally, limiting the scope of the CFAA’s
142 See, for example, US Department of Homeland Security, National Cybersecurity
and Communications Integration Center, Combating the Insider Threat *1–3 (May 2,
2014), archived at https://perma.cc/77FD-SAFV.
143 See Part III.A.2.
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criminal sanctions conforms with the rule of lenity, as several of
the narrow-approach courts have noted.144
Second, in practice, application of the Framework will require further clarification of certain key definitions (for example,
the public/private computer distinction, the meaning of “permission,” and valid methods of affirmative revocation). In some cases,
of course, existing case law sheds light on how these terms should
be defined;145 however, courts will undoubtedly have to further
parse these terms. Nonetheless, this concern should not be considered fatal to the Framework’s viability—after all, interpreting
ambiguous terms and concepts is well within the judiciary’s institutional competencies.
2. Framework benefits.
The Framework offers several contributions to the existing
case law and discourse surrounding the CFAA unauthorized access provisions, namely: (1) advancing the interests underlying
both the broad and narrow approaches, (2) providing a model applicable across a range of factual and technological contexts, and
(3) offering an analytical method consistent with the CFAA’s text
and purpose.
First, the Framework helps to resolve the existing unauthorized access circuit split in a manner that advances both the broad
and narrow approaches’ interests. Discussion surrounding the
unauthorized access circuit split often suggests that the two approaches—the broad approach’s purpose-based inquiry and the
narrow approach’s permission-based inquiry—are fundamentally
incompatible.146 However, as Parts II.B and II.C illustrated, a
closer examination of the broad and narrow approaches indicates
that they are driven by interests (enabling computer owners to
better protect their computers and limiting the CFAA’s scope, respectively) that are by no means mutually exclusive. Arguably,
both the broad and narrow approaches suffer from analytical tunnel vision, focusing on select interests advanced by the CFAA to
the exclusion of others. The narrow-approach courts explicitly
levy this criticism at their broad-approach counterparts. For
144

See notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
See, for example, Power Ventures, 844 F3d at 1068 (lending support for recognizing
cease-and-desist letters and IP blocks as valid methods of affirmative revocation);
Nosal II, 844 F3d at 1036 (same, but for revocation of login credentials).
146 See, for example, Jensen, Comment, 36 Hamline L Rev at 84–85 (cited in note 19)
(positing an either-or choice between the broad and narrow approaches).
145
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instance, the Ninth Circuit has criticized the broad-approach
courts for focusing “only [on] the culpable behavior of the defendants before them,” thereby failing to consider the larger implications of their expansive interpretation of CFAA liability.147 However, the narrow-approach courts are guilty of a similar myopia—
in their zeal to limit the CFAA’s scope, they neglect the interests
that the broad approach’s more expansive read of the CFAA
advances.
Ultimately, both sides of the circuit split miss the reality that
the interests underlying the broad and narrow approaches are, in
fact, reconcilable—a reconciliation that the AGR Framework delivers. For narrow-approach advocates, the Framework offers a
restrained conception of the CFAA unauthorized access provisions’ scope. Under the Framework’s model, the statute only imposes liability when a private computer is involved (Step 1), and
then only when an accesser accesses a computer that either he
never had permission to access (Step 2) or for which his access
permission had been affirmatively revoked (Step 3). Meanwhile,
for broad-approach advocates, Step 3’s permission-revocation
analysis will ensure that computer owners retain the ability to
exert control over who has access to their systems. Admittedly,
the Framework requires that computer owners exert this control
in a more proactive manner than they would under the broad approach. For example, Step 3 requires that the owner affirmatively
revoke access through a mechanism like a cease-and-desist letter,
password revocation, or technical countermeasure, rather than by
simply burying use prohibitions in a TOS agreement.148 Nevertheless, though Step 3 may require more affirmative monitoring
from computer owners, it still provides them with a mechanism
to ultimately control who accesses their systems.149
Second, the Framework articulates a model that can be applied in diverse factual and technological contexts. As discussed
in Part II.D, the CFAA’s unauthorized access provisions are increasingly being applied outside of the employment context in
which they have historically been invoked. The Framework
acknowledges this trend, providing an approach to the

147

Nosal I, 676 F3d at 862.
See Part III.B.3 for additional discussion of Step 3.
149 It is also worth reiterating that, even if a court’s application of the AGR Framework renders the CFAA inapplicable in a given case, the computer owner can still pursue
any number of non-CFAA remedies in response to computer-related misconduct (for example, contract or trade secret claims).
148
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unauthorized access inquiry based on concepts—public/private
computers, permission, and affirmative revocation—that are
largely context and technology neutral. Moreover, the Framework
incorporates the concepts of the public/private computer distinction and affirmative revocation, both of which have surfaced in
case law and academic commentary, but have remained largely
ignored within the foundational cases defining the unauthorized
access circuit split. As a result, the Framework can address a wide
range of analytical challenges, spanning different types of fact
patterns (both within and outside of the employment context) and
technology scenarios (whether they be traditional database access
cases, like Valle and Rodriguez, or more novel cases, like hiQ Labs
and Power Ventures).
Third, the Framework delivers the aforementioned benefits
in a manner consistent with the CFAA’s text and purpose. As discussed in Part I.B, the CFAA’s definitions of the two terms foundational to its unauthorized access provisions—“without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access”—are either nonexistent
(for the former) or largely unhelpful (for the latter). The Framework remedies this gap, offering courts a simple model that synthesizes concepts from post–CFAA enactment case law to flesh
out the minimal definitional guidance offered in the CFAA’s
text.150 The Framework is similarly consistent with the Act’s purpose, regardless of which of the prevailing views regarding this
purpose one adopts. At the broadest level, there is little doubt that
Congress intended to construct a more robust legal regime for addressing computer crime.151 The AGR Framework, by clarifying
core CFAA provisions, undeniably aligns with this purpose. Moreover, the AGR Framework also serves the CFAA purposes
advocated by both sides of the present circuit split. For those who
posit that the CFAA was intended to focus specifically on the

150 By limiting the power of computer owners to define unauthorized access, the AGR
Framework can also be justified as helping courts to apply the principle of constitutional
avoidance in the CFAA context. A common criticism of the broad approach is that it renders the CFAA unconstitutionally vague by (1) failing to provide individuals with sufficient notice of what behavior is prohibited and (2) encouraging arbitrary and selective enforcement. A narrower interpretation of the CFAA, critics argue, is thus necessary in order
to render the CFAA constitutional. See, for example, Jensen, Comment, 36 Hamline L Rev
at 115–19 (cited in note 19). See also Note, The Vagaries of Vagueness: Rethinking the
CFAA as a Problem of Private Nondelegation, 127 Harv L Rev 751, 755–57 (2013) (summarizing relevant case law and academic commentary).
151 See, for example, S Rep No 99-432 at 2 (cited in note 13) (noting that “existing
criminal laws are insufficient to address the problem of computer crime”).
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computer-hacker threat,152 the AGR Framework provides a solution: Step 2 of the AGR Framework is tailored specifically to address the hacker threat. Meanwhile, for those who argue that the
CFAA is also meant to encompass the actions of the insider
threat,153 Step 3 of the Framework offers a way for computer
owners to assert control over their systems in response to such
concerns.
Ultimately, these benefits vastly outweigh the drawbacks
discussed in the previous Section. For the cost of a reduced emphasis on access purpose and a need to flesh out some concepts,
the Framework will offer courts an analytical model that advances the interests underlying both sides of the present circuit
split, is adaptive to new fact patterns and technologies, and aligns
with the statute’s text and purpose.
CONCLUSION
The CFAA is almost forty years old. It was passed at a time
when the concept of computer crime was in its infancy and the
idea of the “computer hacker” was just entering the cultural
mainstream. Unsurprisingly, the nature of computer crime has
evolved since then, raising questions about precisely what threats
the CFAA is intended to address. It is this debate that has given
rise to the present circuit split regarding what it means under the
CFAA to access a computer “without authorization” or in a manner that “exceeds authorized access.”
This Comment provides a novel answer to that decades-old
question. The AGR Framework offers an analytical model to resolve the unauthorized access circuit split, asking (1) whether the
computer in question is publicly available or private; (2) whether
the computer’s owner had, at any point, granted the accesser permission to access the computer; and (3) whether the computer
owner had affirmatively revoked the accesser’s permission, if any,
prior to the purportedly unauthorized access. Ultimately, the
Framework articulates a model that advances the interests of
both the broad and narrow approaches—preserving computersystem integrity and appropriately limiting the CFAA’s scope—
and is applicable across a range of factual and technological

152 For legislative materials suggesting the focus was on the computer-hacker threat,
see HR Rep No 99-612 at 5–6 (cited in note 7); HR Rep No 98-894 at 10–11 (cited in
note 10).
153 See Part III.D.1 for additional discussion of this view.
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contexts. In this way, the Framework will help to ensure the
CFAA unauthorized access provisions’ continued viability,
thereby preserving one of the criminal justice system’s foundational tools for combating computer crime.

